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Humans use a variety of cues to infer an object’s weight, including how easily
objects can be moved. For example, if we observe an object being blown down
the street by thewind,we can infer that it is light.Here,we testedwhetherNew
Caledonian crowsmake this type of inference. After training that only one type
of object (either light or heavy) was rewarded when dropped into a food dis-
penser, birds observed pairs of novel objects (one light and one heavy)
suspended from strings in front of an electric fan. The fan was either on—
creating a breeze which buffeted the light, but not the heavy, object—or off,
leaving both objects stationary. In subsequent test trials, birds could drop
one, or both, of the novel objects into the food dispenser. Despite having no
opportunity to handle these objects prior to testing, birds touched the correct
object (light or heavy) first in 73% of experimental trials, andwere at chance in
control trials. Our results suggest that birds used pre-existing knowledge
about the behaviour exhibited by differently weighted objects in the wind to
infer their weight, using this information to guide their choices.1. Introduction
Humans are able to use a variety of cues to infer the approximate weight of an
object without direct handling. Using our prior experience, we can tell from glan-
cing at the material that a piece of cardboard should be lighter than a plank of
wood; that a ball of cottonwool should be lighter than a brick.We can also acquire
information about the weight of unfamiliar objects through observing their phys-
ical interactions in the world. For example, if a human observes someone easily
raising one box over their head, but then struggling to lift a second, the observer
can immediately infer which box contains something heavy. By age five, children
infer weight in this manner, judging an object’s weight just by observing an actor
lifting and transporting it [1], while adults are highly proficient at inferring an
object’s weight from observing another person’s actions [2–4].
We can equally infer the weight of objects from observing their physical inter-
actionswith other inanimate objects, orwith unobservable forces such as thewind.
For example, if we see one cardboard box blowing down the street in a breeze, and
one remaining stationary despite gale forcewinds,we can inferwhich box is heavy
and which is light. This ability to draw inferences about an object’s properties
through observation, rather than only through direct handling, is likely to be
useful in awide range of contexts. It allows us to evaluate riskswithout encounter-
ing the potential danger directly [5], to anticipate the physical exertion required to
lift an object [6,7], and to make complex judgements about concepts such as stab-
ility and support, even from infancy [8]. Given thesewide-ranging uses, this ability
may be shared with other species. Yet, at present, we know almost nothing about
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2the extent to which non-human animals make inferences about
properties of objects, such asweight, throughobservation alone.
A few studies have investigated the perception of weight
by animals, focusing largely on chimpanzees. Povinelli
argues, from several experiments conductedwith chimpanzees,
that only humans are capable of understanding directly unob-
servable causal features like weight [9]. They report that,
while chimpanzees succeed at sorting objects on the basis of
their weight, they fail to demonstrate the more sophisticated
understanding of weight as a causal force in numerous contexts.
This included experiments where the chimpanzees observed
humans struggle to pull heavy boxes towards themselves, but
failed to select a lighter box when given a choice, and exper-
iments in which the chimpanzees heard the differing sounds
of heavy and light objects being dropped behind a screen, but
did not appear to expect the dropped object to have a particular
weight. Other researchers argue that, like many cognitive abil-
ities, any distinction between human and non-human
capacities to understand weight is likely to be more nuanced
[10,11], citing results that hint at a more comprehensive under-
standing of weight, found in other labs. For example, Hanus
& Call demonstrated that chimps will search for a hidden
banana in the lowerof two cupsonabalancebeam[12], presum-
ably by making the inference that the weight of the banana
caused the balance beam to tilt. This experiment has been repli-
cated in the aforementioned Povinelli study, which concluded
that it is unfit to test for such understanding of weight without
including a control condition involving a heavierweight, which
the chimpanzees failed [9]. Asyet, there is no clear consensus on
the extent to which non-human primates perceive weight in a
comparable manner to humans.
Studies with other species, including some corvids [13–16],
indicate they will select nuts and seeds based on weight, prob-
ably as a proxy to distinguish between full and empty nuts
before attempting to open them. However, to our knowledge,
no experiments have investigated whether these species make
inferences about objects’ weights before directly handling
them. This lack of research is striking given the wealth of inves-
tigations of core knowledge using observational paradigms
with non-human animals. Core knowledge refers to the systems
to represent objects, actions, number and space, possessed by
humans, that emerge during typical development, and may
be present from birth [17]. Among birds, research shows that
precocial chicks enter the world with some core knowledge
about objects, spatial relationships and number, as they will
take into account spatial and numerical configurations when
imprinting on artificial objects [18]. Research using expectation
of violation paradigms has indicated that a variety of species
(including corvids: rooks [19] and Eurasian jays [20]) possess
an understanding of support relations—that objects will fall if
they are not adequately supported by a solid surface—with
rooks behaving similarly to 6.5-month-old humans.
In the current experiment, we tested whether one corvid
species—New Caledonian crow (Corvus moneduloides)—
makes judgements about weight through observation alone.
We chose to focus on this species because they show sophisti-
cated tool use and manufacture in the wild [21], and captive
experiments demonstrate that these birds exhibit flexible
manufacturing abilities [22,23] and understand some of the
functional properties of their tools [23,24]. Like other corvids,
they perform well on physical problem-solving tasks, such as
the trap-tube [25,26] and Aesop’s fable water displacement
tasks [27–30]. New Caledonian crows may be a particularlypromising test case because these birds have also demonstrated
some capacity to make inferences in captivity. For example,
they appear to be able to reason by exclusion [31], and about
hidden causal agents [32]. Furthermore, when tested in object
choice tasks, they readily discriminate between small objects
of different weights (e.g. 1 versus 10 grams) [28,33,34], and
recently, a study of the crows’ exploration behaviour demon-
strated that these birds learn about the object weight during
their own spontaneous object exploration. The crows appeared
to recall which objects they had experienced as light or heavy
when later presented with an apparatus that could only be
opened by dropping a heavy object inside [35]. However,
crows failed to demonstrate an immediate understanding of
the relevance ofweightwhen dropping non-functional feathers
[36], or other light objects [37], onto a collapsible platform.
Here, we designed a novel experiment to test whetherwild-
caught NewCaledonian crows infer theweight of novel objects
after observing their movements in a breeze, by assessing
whether they use that information to guide their choices on
an object-choice task. Specifically, crowswere given the oppor-
tunity to observe novel objects being buffeted in a breeze
created byan electric fan (light objects), or remaining stationary
despite the breeze (heavy objects). To test this, crows were first
trained that either heavy or light familiar objects were
rewarded when dropped into a tube next to a food dispenser.
Once they had acquired this rule, the birds were given the
opportunity to observe novel objects suspended from strings
in front of the fan, which was turned on and generating a
breeze (experimental condition) or turned off (control con-
dition). If birds had inferred the weight of the objects, when
we later gave them the choice of the two novel objects, we
expected them to be more accurate at selecting the correct
object (light for six birds and heavy for six birds) when they
had observed the objects moving in front of the fan when
turned on, than in the control condition when the fan was
off. If successful this would suggest the New Caledonian
crows have a representation of weight as an unobservable
causal mechanism—an ability that some researchers have
claimed to be unique to humans [9].2. Methods
(a) Subjects
Subjects were 12 New Caledonian crows caught from the wild (at
location 21.678 S, 165.688 E) on Grande Terre, New Caledonia.
The birds were held in captivity in a large 10-compartment out-
door aviary, with approximately 7  4  4 m per compartment,
on Grande Terre close, situated close to their location of capture,
for the purposes of non-invasive behavioural research from April
to August 2016 (six birds) and April to August 2017 (six other
birds). The birds were caught using a whoosh net, by baiting
an area around the net until crows were regularly feeding on it
and then releasing the net when a family group of crows were
present. The birds were housed in small family groups, with
the home compartments containing a range of natural enrich-
ment materials, such as logs, branches, shells and pine cones.
The sample comprised seven adults, one sub-adult (1–2 years
old) and four juveniles (less than 1 year-old), of which seven
were male and five female (electronic supplementary material,
table S1). Sex was determined by body size, and age by beak
coloration [38]. Subjects were generally not food-deprived, and
their daily diet consisted of meat, dog food, eggs and fruit,
with water available ad libitum. The birds were trained to stand
on weighing scales (by placing a small piece of food in front of
training: familiar objects(a)
(b)
(c)
test: novel objects
test: novel objects
Figure 1. Photographs of the experimental stages. (a) Light versus heavy train-
ing. Birds learned to drop either familiar light or heavy objects into the tube to
obtain rewards (bottle caps containing meat) which slid out of the wooden food
dispenser box, controlled remotely by the experimenter from outside the cage.
(b) Observational phase. Birds observed novel pairs of visually distinct objects
(one light, one heavy) presented in front of a fan. The fan was either on, causing
the light object to blow around in the breeze (experimental condition) or off and
both objects were stationary (control condition). (c) Choice phase. The two novel
objects were presented on the table close to the tube and food dispenser. Birds
were free to interact with both objects and could choose to drop one or both
objects into the tube.
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birds were maintained at or above their capture weight during
their stay in the aviary. Subjects were tested individually in tem-
porary visual isolation in an adjacent compartment to the rest of
the birds. After capture, the birds were first acclimatized to the avi-
aries in April and then tested in this experiment in May–July. The
training and testing procedures for this experiment are outlined in
the procedure. All crows were released back into the wild at their
site of capture after testing. A previous study indicated that, in a
comparable situation to the present study, crows successfully
reintegrate into the wild after being subjects in the aviary [39].
(b) Materials
(i) Familiar objects
Birdswere first trainedwith a set of heavy and light objects, as used
in [34], withwhich theywere either already familiar (2016 birds), or
became familiar with during training (2017 birds). Thus, these are
referred to as the ‘familiar objects’. Heavy familiar objects were
grey rectangular blocks of varied sizes (approx. 1  2  3 cm),
and red cubes (approx. 2 cm3) all weighing 10–15 g. Light familiar
objects were white polystyrene rectangular blocks of varied sizes
(approx. 1  23 cm), and blue spheres (1.5–2.5 cm diameter),
all weighing less than 1 g.
(ii) Novel objects
To test whether birds inferred the weight of objects that they had
not previously handled, tests were conducted with unique pairs
of visually distinct novel objects, one heavy and one light. Birds
had never seen the novel objects before each test session. Heavy
novel objects were made from clay and small fishing weights
(weighing 10–15 g), and light novel objects were made from poly-
styrene (all less than 1 g). All objects were coveredwith paper, tape
and/or paint to conceal their construction materials, and varied in
size (2–4 cm3), shape, colour, pattern and covering material (see
electronic supplementary material, figure S1 for examples). One
light and one heavy version were made for each object design,
and the version presented was counterbalanced across birds (for
example, some birds were tested with a heavy brown cross, and
some birds were tested with a light brown cross). This ensured
that there were no systematic differences between the appearance
of light and heavy objects.
(iii) Procedure
Light versus heavy training. All crows were first trained to drop
objects into containers to obtain rewards, dropping them into a
Perspex apparatus (see [37]), a Perspex tube, or awooden food dis-
penser box. 2017 birds were trained to perform this behaviour
using natural stones only (weighing 5–15 g), while 2016 birds
hadparticipated in twoprior experiments that also involveddiscri-
minating between some man-made light and heavy objects (see
[34,37]). At the start of the present experiment, all birds were
trained to drop the familiar objects into a transparent Perspex
tube (170 mm high) which was placed next to a wooden box con-
taining an electronic food dispenser. Each time an object was
dropped into the tube birds would receive a reward (a bottle cap
containingmeat) from the dispenser, whichwas operated remotely
by the experimenter (figure 1a).
Once birds had learned to drop objects into the tube, they were
trained that either only heavy objects (six birds) or only light
objects (six birds) were rewarded. For this training, first, on each
trial, eight heavy and eight light familiar objects were placed on
the table, and birds could drop the objects into the tube to attempt
to obtain rewards. Birds received training sessions of this type until
they dropped all eight rewarded objects into the tube, before anyof
the unrewarded objects, on two sessions in a row. The birds
dropped all correct objects first from the start. They were thentrained to choose between pairs of objects. On each trial, one
light and one heavy object were placed on the table, each in a sep-
arate sand-filled tray, approximately 50 cm from the tube
(figure 1a). Birds received eight trials per block, until they chose
the correct object on every trial on three blocks in a row (which
all birds did from the start of this training stage without error).
To assess whether birds would generalize the rule that only
light or only heavy objects were rewarded to novel objects, birds
were then given the opportunity to handle a pair of novel, visually
distinct objects (one light, one heavy). Each object was placed into
a short container, partially filled with sand, on top of a bottle cap
containing meat. Birds had to lift each object out of each container
(and therefore experience its weight), in order to reach the food.
Once birds had lifted each object 14 times they received a test ses-
sion to determinewhether they chose the ‘correct’ object (heavy or
light depending on prior training) to insert into the tube (see
4royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rspb
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twelve birds selected the correct novel object first and dropped
this object into the tube. This indicated that, at a group level,
these birds were capable of generalizing the rule to novel objects
that only heavy or only light objects were rewarded. We therefore
progressed to the experiment proper.
Experiment proper. In the main experiment, birds received one
test per day, with an ‘observation phase’ conducted in themorning
and a ‘choice phase’ conducted in the afternoon, approximately
2–3 h later. There were two conditions: (1) the experimental con-
dition, where the light, but not the heavy, object blew around in
a breeze created by an electric fan during the observational
phase, and (2) the control condition, where the fan was off, and
both objects were stationary during the observational phase.
Birds experienced one pair of novel objects per day, alternating
between the experimental and control condition each day; half of
the birds began with the experimental condition. The novel objects
were counterbalanced across the experiment such that all objects
were used as stimuli in the experimental condition for some
birds and in the control condition for the remainder. This ensured
that any differences between our conditions could not be attribu-
ted to the objects themselves. Birds tested in 2017 experienced
five pairs of novel objects in each condition, while birds in 2016
had three novel object pairs due to time constraints.
Observational phase. Beginning in the morning, birds received
three observational sessions, each lasting 5 min, spaced approxi-
mately 1 h apart. In each observational session, the two novel
objects were placed on the table though attached to thin strings
suspended from hooks, with the hooks positioned 40 cm above a
table, in front of a large electric fan (figure 1b). When the fan
was on (experimental condition), the light object was light
enough to be buffeted around at the end of its string by the
breeze the fan created, while the heavy object remained stationary
on the table. When the fan was off (control condition), both objects
were stationary on the table. To prevent any unintended move-
ment, in the control condition both objects were lightly attached
to the tablewith blue-tack, not visible to the bird. Objects were vis-
ible from any point in the cage; however, to ensure the bird gained
a close view, and felt the breeze from the fan (when on), in each
5min trial the experimenter baited a perch that lead to the table
on which the objects and fan were presented. The breeze could
be felt by a human observer, hence the authors inferred that the
birds could feel the breeze, albeit to a degree towhich is unknown.
At the base of this perch the breeze from the fan (when on) could be
felt; however, a 10 cm wire mesh barrier prevented the birds from
interactingwith the novel objects. The perchwas baited three times
in each 5min trial and birds always took the bait.
Choice phase. At the start of the choice phase test session, the
bird was brought into the testing room, where the same objects
and arrangement from the observational phase were already sus-
pended in front of the fan. The fan was either on or off
depending on the condition. Unlike the observational sessions,
here, the tube, food dispenser box and object trays were also
all present on the table. There were three stages in the choice
phase: (1) The bird received two familiar object trials to ensure
they remembered the rule, which all birds did. (2) The exper-
imenter then baited the perch leading to the suspended objects
in the same manner as in the observational trials. (3) Once the
bird had obtained the bait, the experimenter entered the room
and removed the two novel objects from the strings and placed
them on the table, each in a sand-filled tray (figure 1c). The
bird then had the opportunity to come down to the table and
drop one or both objects into the tube. Birds were rewarded in
line with the rule they had learned; thus, either the light or
heavy object was rewarded. Trials ended when birds left the
table after dropping the object(s) into the tube. If the bird did
not come down to the table within 1 min, or left the table without
interacting with either object, the experimenter baited the tablewith a small piece of meat. At the end of the trial, the exper-
imenter removed the objects from the tube and placed them
back in the sand-filled trays (randomising which object was on
the right or left) for a total of five trials.
(c) Analysis
Our primarymeasurewaswhich object the bird touched first on its
very first trial with each pair of novel objects, before they had any
direct experience handling either object. This allowedus to examine
whether crows correctly discriminated between the two objects
before they had had any direct feedback, via their own manipu-
lation, of each object’s weight. We also recorded which object the
bird dropped into the tube first on their first trial with each pair
of novel objects. For this experiment, the object dropped into the
tube first was considered a secondary measurement because once
the bird had touched an object—even if only briefly—they had
the opportunity to gain extra information about the weight of
that object. Thus, the birds’ first object touches, for each pair of
novel objects, informs us about the birds’ understanding of the
novel objects when they have observed these objects only, while
the first object drop occurs after they have observed the objects
and had some opportunity to interact with the objects. We ran
one sample Wilcoxon-signed rank tests—using the percentage of
first trials where the object was (a) touched and (b) dropped first,
per bird—to assesswhether birds touched and dropped the correct,
rewarded object first, more often than would be expected by
chance. Our control condition was designed to test whether birds
used unintended visual cues to identify objects as heavy or light.
Aswe did not know a priori how birds would behave in this control
condition, we compared performance in both the experimental and
control condition to chance.
Additionally, we recorded four further secondary measure-
ments. In our experiment, birds received 5 trials with each pair
of objects, therefore, we took four measures of the birds’ inter-
actions with the incorrect object during these trials, which we
compared across the experimental and control conditions. These
additional measurements, collected across all five trials, were the
number of trials on which the bird touched the incorrect object
(a) first or (b) at any point, and dropped the incorrect object (c)
first or (d) at any point (before or after the correct object). We con-
ducted generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) [40] using R
(version 3.4.3) [41] to assess which factors influenced our four
measurements of interactionswith the incorrect object. Interactions
with the incorrect object were binary variables, coded as occurring
(1) or not (0), and were entered as dependent variables in the
models. We included the random effect of bird ID, test number
(three tests per condition per bird for 2016 birds, five tests for
2017 birds) and trial number (five trials per test). We included
fixed effects of condition (experimental or control condition) and
rewarded object (whether the bird was rewarded for light or
heavy objects). We used likelihood ratio tests to compare the full
model (all predictor variables, random effects and control vari-
ables) first with a null model (random effects, no predictor
variables), and then with reduced models to test each of the effects
of interest [42]. All experimental trial videos were coded by S.A.J.
and Anna Frohnwieser, finding 100% agreement.3. Results
Our primary finding was that birds touched the correct object
first, on their first trial with each pair of novel objects, signifi-
cantly more often than chance in the experimental condition
(35/48 first touches correct, 72.9%, one-sample Wilcoxon test:
Z ¼ 70, p ¼ 0.01). Birds performed at chance level in the
control condition when the fan was off and both objects were
stationary (23/48, 47.9%, Z ¼ 27, p ¼ 0.34; figure 2a). When
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in each condition, 11/12 birds touched the correct object first in
the experimental condition (binomial test: p ¼ 0.003); 6/12
birds touched the correct object first in the control (p ¼ 0.226).
Birds were highly accurate when choosing the correct
object to drop on their first trial with each pair of novel
objects in both conditions (experimental: 44/48 first drops
correct, 92%, one-sample Wilcoxon test: Z ¼ 77, p ¼ 0.002;
control: 38/48, 79%, Z ¼ 68.5, p ¼ 0.017; figure 2b). Across
both conditions, birds almost exclusively dropped the correct
object first into the tube if they had touched the correct object
first (experimental: 35/35 trials, 100%; control: 22/23, 96%),
but also dropped the correct object first on more than half
of the trials where they initially touched the incorrect object
(experimental: 9/13, 69%; control: 16/25, 64%).
For the models analysing the birds’ interactions with
the incorrect objects across all trials, the null model and the
full model differed significantly for all four variables of inter-
est, finding significant effects of condition on each variable:
(1) Touched incorrect first (x2 ¼ 15.758, d.f. ¼ 2, p  0.001;
Experimental or Control condition: z ¼ 3.716, p  0.001);
(2) Touched incorrect at any point (x2 ¼ 27.747, d.f. ¼ 2, p 
0.001; z ¼ 4.679, p  0.001) (3) Dropped incorrect into the tube
first (x2 ¼ 15.76, d.f. ¼ 2, p  0.001; z ¼ 3.72, p  0.001)
and (4) Dropped incorrect at any point (x2 ¼ 20.278, d.f. ¼ 2,
p  0.001; z ¼ 4.098, p  0.001). For all four variables, the
birds interacted with the incorrect object more often in
the control than in the experimental condition (figure 2c).
There was no significant effect of ‘rewarded object’ (whether
the light or heavy object was rewarded) on any of the
variables of interest ( p. 0.05).4. Discussion
Our results demonstrate that New Caledonian crows were sig-
nificantly more accurate at discriminating between novel light
and heavy objects when they had previously observed these
objects either moving or remaining stationary in a breeze cre-
ated by an electric fan. After this experience, birds touched
the correct object first, on their very first trial with each set of
novel objects, more often than expected by chance. When the
fan was off—and birds did not have access to this source of
information about the objects’ weight—the birds were equally
likely to touch the incorrect or correct object first.
Our results appear to be robust for a number of reasons.
First, therewere no groupdifference in birds previously trained
to select light objects versus heavy objects. Consequently, our
results cannot be explained by a general preference for select-
ing the objects that moved (or did not move) in front of the
fan: each group preferentially selected the object which fitted
the rule that they had learned. Second, all the novel objects
were used in both control and experimental conditions (coun-
terbalanced across birds). Given that birds performed at chance
in the control condition, they did not appear to be able to use
any unintended visual cues from the objects to determine
which object was heavy or light. Third, birds received a small
number of tests to limit opportunities for learning. Impor-
tantly, 11/12 birds touched the correct object first on their
very first trial in the experimental condition versus 6/12 in
the control. These first trial successes demonstrate that the
birds did not succeed by learning to use movement as a cue
over the course of the experiment. With these factors in
mind, the simplest explanation for our results is that New
6royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rspb
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behaviour exhibited by differently weighted objects in
the wind, to infer whether the novel objects were heavy or
light, then used this information to guide their choices.
Importantly, the information birds used could not have
been a single assessment of utility for the task (e.g. whether
the object was ‘good to drop into the tube’). Rather, there
was a single underlying property (weight) that predicted
both the object’s utility in the task, and the object’s movement
in a breeze. Only an inference of a single underlying property
would have allowed them to transfer information observed
allocentrically—how the wind affected different objects—into
an egocentric choice between two objects of different weight
[43,44]. However, the exact content of this abstract concept of
‘weight’ does remain unclear. Crows may have had a full
understanding of weight like humans; alternatively, they
may have possessed only a partial understanding of weight.
For example, the crows may have evaluated the objects in
terms of how easily they could be moved, both by the wind
and by themselves (i.e. something akin to displaceability),
but may not have evaluated the objects as being ‘heavy’ or
‘light’ in terms of other physical interactions, such as whether
they would also sink or float. Another possibility is that their
understanding of weight may have been based on an ability
to perceive the affordances of objects by observing the wind’s
effect on them [45]. Testing to see how closely the crows’ con-
cept of weight across different contexts mirrors that of
humans will be a focus of future work.
Across all five choice trials with each novel object pair,
birds interacted with the incorrect object more in the control
than the experimental condition. However, despite the differ-
ence in the number of interactions with the incorrect object
across the two conditions overall birds made relatively few
errors after their first touch in both conditions (figure 2c).
This occurred even though there was no penalty to the bird
for interacting with both objects during test trials, and birds
were not required to drop the correct object first to obtain
the reward. When they did touch the incorrect object first
on their first trial, birds successfully switched to dropping
the correct object into the tube for their first object drop in
over half of these trials, indicating that they could typically
discard the incorrect object without receiving direct feedback
on whether this particular object was rewarded. This did not
happen on every trial, possibly due to limits on the birds’
inhibitory control [34]. However, overall, this pattern of
behaviour demonstrates that these birds were highly capable
of retaining and generalizing the rule that only light or only
heavy objects were rewarded, and needed minimal handling
experience to learn and remember which of the novel objects
was light or heavy across the five trials of each novel object
test. The weight of small, manipulable objects may therefore
be a particularly salient characteristic for this species to learn
about [46].
A number of species select nuts and seeds on the basis of
their weight before attempting to open them [13–16]. New
Caledonian crows eat candlenuts and snails, which they drop
from heights on to hard surfaces to break open [47,48]. It has
not been tested whether they select candlenuts on the basis
of their weight, though our observations indicate that this
would be possible. Theweight of candlenuts and snails, similar
in size to our objects, may be an ecologically relevant feature,
and may account for the birds’ rapid learning, and inferential
abilities, when tested with these types of objects.Here, we were interested in whether these birds could
infer the weight of the novel objects, not whether the birds
remembered which object had moved in the breeze. Therefore,
our experimental design minimized memory demands and
facilitated encoding of the relevant object properties. We pre-
sented the test set-up before, after and concurrently with the
opportunity to observe the novel objects (see [49] for task
presentation order effect on information encoding in a primate
tool-use task). Equally, here, we presented birds with three
5min trials of continuous motion (or absence of motion) to
ensure they had sufficient time to observe the events. Having
established that birds do gain information from observing
objects moving in the wind, it may be of interest to know
how much observational time is necessary. In human infants,
the level of exploratory interactions required by infants to
learn about object properties and relation differs across tasks
[50]. For example, 11-month-olds need to explore taskmaterials
before they will demonstrate that they can infer an object’s
weight using compression information [8]. Crows may make
rapid judgements about object weight from only brief obser-
vations of the objects’ movements, or learn from single
events, such as the sound it makes when dropped. Future
experiments are required to test this.
Our findings are particularly interesting as they provide the
first indication that a bird species has the capacity tomake infer-
ences about weight. This finding, though testing only a single
type of inference, contrasts with Povinelli’s claim, based on
the failures exhibited by chimpanzees, that only humans have
a causal understanding of weight [9]. Here, New Caledonian
crows demonstrated first trial successes, followed by continued
above chance performance, in a novel situationwhich provided
only indirect information about the objects’ weights. Thus,
these birds appear to have general prior expectations of how
differently weighted objects should behave when observed in
a novel context.
These results stand in contrast to recent findings
suggesting that New Caledonian cannot use observations of
physical interactions ‘accidentally’ resulting from their own
actions to perform causal interventions [51]. In the present
study, crows were able to pick-up causal information from
observing the wind interacting with an object. Among
humans, the extraction of object features, like weight, from
observing another person’s actions appears to involve
implicit, rather than explicit, reasoning and involves the obser-
ver’s motor system. That is, the observer’s own prior
experiences of handling objects can inform their perception
of objects, when they are seen to be handled by another indi-
vidual [52,53]. If a similar cognitive process underpinned the
crows performance here, it could explain this discrepancy:
New Caledonian crows are capable of implicitly inferring
causal information, but not explicitly using this to create
novel behaviours. Another possibility is that the crows failure
was a task artefact [51]. When confronted with an artificial
apparatus whose mechanism is not easily comprehensible,
the birds may revert to basic instrumental learning of action-
outcome associations despite being capable of more sophisti-
cated reasoning in more ecologically relevant contexts. While
the fan used in this experiment was also artificial, and both
studies involved an ecologically relevant action (dropping)—
though the goal of this action differed—attending to the pres-
ence of wind would likely have been more ecologically salient
than attending to the inner workings of a food dispenser. Such
an explanation requires further investigation.
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immediate understanding of the relevance of weight in other
contexts; particularly, experiments involving artificial appa-
ratuses [36,37]. When presented with a Perspex apparatus
containing a collapsible baited platform, crows drop feathers
[36], or other light objects [37], which were insufficiently
heavy to collapse the platform and obtain the reward. It
should be noted that dropping the light objects did not pre-
vent the crows from obtaining the reward as they could still
drop heavy, rewarded objects afterwards. This performance
is similar to the equally unsuccessful behaviours in a compar-
able task with chimpanzees [9]. In the light of our current
results, these failures may indicate limitations in the animals’
understanding of the apparatuses, rather than a generally
poor grasp of the concept of weight. Additionally, as the
crows also sometimes dropped unrewarded (light or heavy)
objects in the present study, this behaviour generally may
reflect play or exploration, rather than an inability to infer
the weight of objects based on their movement. Future
studies may address this by ending the trial after the subject
has made one choice.
To date, the ability to learn from observations has almost
exclusively been studied in a social context. Typically, subjects
observe another individual’s actions or interactions with an
object, and are then tested behaviourally to determine what
they have learned (e.g. [1,54]). However, New Caledonian
crows have not performed well in cognitive tests conducted
in a social context, such as observing demonstrators. Like
many non-primates, without extensive training, these birds
fail to choose the rewarded cup afterobserving a humanvisibly
place a reward into one of three containers [55]. They have also
failed to recognize the need for a partner in a cooperative task
[56], and demonstrate stimulus enhancement, but not imita-
tion, in a social learning task [57]. Our results are striking in
that they suggest that New Caledonian crows are capable of
gaining nuanced information about objects from observing
their physical interactions, despite their poor performance on
tasks that involve observing other types of events.
Overall, our results suggest that these birds are capable of
making inferences about the properties of objects in theworld around them, without having to directly experience
those properties themselves. This form of learning through
observations has received minimal attention among animals
to date, but may reflect an important source of information.
Failures by chimpanzees on comparable tasks have led some
researchers to argue that only humans are capable of represent-
ing weight as a causal mechanism [9]; however, our results
suggest this is not the case. Determining the weight of small
objects may be particularly relevant to New Caledonian
crows, as they consume candlenuts, for which weight corre-
lates with quality, and drop snails, which can be very heavy
relative to a crows’ body weight [48]. They also use tools,
where theweight of a tool is likely to affect effort and outcome,
whichmay lead crows to bemore selective.Whether this ability
to infer theweight of objects is widely spread across the animal
kingdom, or only a feature of animals with broadly high levels
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